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ABSTRACT 
Wireless Sensor Nodes (motes) have witnessed rapid development in the last two decades. Though the design 
considerations for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been widely discussed in the literature, limited 
investigation has been done for their application in pipeline surveillance. Given the increasing number of 
pipeline incidents across the globe, there is an urgent need for innovative and effective solutions for deterring the 
incessant pipeline incidents and attacks. WSN pose as a suitable candidate for such solutions, since they can be 
used to measure, detect and provide actionable information on pipeline physical characteristics such as 
temperature, pressure, video, oil and gas motion and environmental parameters. This paper presents 
specifications of motes for pipeline surveillance based on integrated systems architecture. The proposed 
architecture utilizes a Multi-Agent System (MAS) for the realization of an Integrated Oil Pipeline Monitoring and 
Incident Mitigation System (IOPMIMS) that can effectively monitor and provide actionable information for 
pipelines. The requirements and components of motes, different threats to pipelines and ways of detecting such 
threats presented in this paper will enable better deployment of pipeline surveillance systems for incident 
mitigation. It was identified that the shortcomings of the existing wireless sensor nodes as regards their 
application to pipeline surveillance are not effective for surveillance systems. The resulting specifications provide 
a framework for designing a cost-effective system, cognizant of the design considerations for wireless sensor 
motes used in pipeline surveillance. 
Keywords: Pipeline Monitoring; Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP); Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN);  
                 Wireless Sensor Node (Mote); Data Fusion; Pipeline Surveillance 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Following increasing terrorism, militancy and cyber-attacks, the need for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) was demonstrated on February 12, 2013 when President Obama 
issued an executive order for cyber security critical infrastructure protection. Oil pipelines as 
critical infrastructures need adequate layered security for proper protection. Recent events show 
that pipeline threats are no longer mere corrosion and operational errors as witnessed two 
decades ago. Concerns for pipelines are now terrorists, militants and cyber-attackers who hack 
into Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and other pipeline monitoring systems. 
Common pipeline monitoring techniques include fiber optics, satellite systems, Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Seismic sensors, patrol teams, mass balance and Wireless Sensor 
Network (WSN) techniques.  WSN technique is very promising and has attracted a lot of interest 
as evident in Al-Kadi et al. [1] and Yu and Guo [2].  Due to wide application of WSN, designers 
have always designed generic WSN motes that could fit various purposes.  However, in order to 
achieve better efficiency for specific tasks, it is sensible that analysis of optimization factors for 
such system design is done.  Zilan and Tavli [3] as well as Augusto, Vieira and Di [4] discussed 
existing WSN motes and Microcontrollers but none of these is adequate for pipeline monitoring. 
With rising global pipeline insecurity, there is need for WSN mote designed for pipeline 
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surveillance. This work discusses the requirements and features of a WSN mote for pipeline 
surveillance. 
In pipeline surveillance, satellite method discussed in Peng, Yun and Honghong [5] is widely 
used in USA and Canada because majority of their pipeline incidents are due to excavation 
damages. In Europe however, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) method is attracting some 
interests since they could be used in mission critical tasks that present high safety risks for 
people [6]. Also fiber optics method is often used owing to high sensitivity of fiber optic sensors 
as applied to leakage detection.  WSN comprises motes otherwise known as wireless sensor 
nodes that are interconnected wirelessly to measure and detect physical quantities like 
temperature, pressure, sound, video, etc. WSN offer many benefits over other techniques. It is 
low cost, reliable, available, functional in adverse conditions and compatible with other methods 
thus providing redundancy and reliability [2]. Pipelines by nature span wide geographical areas 
and therefore need robust real-time monitoring for adequate security.  The low-cost nature of 
WSN makes it very adequate for this task. However, power sustainability and multimedia 
transmission are among some challenges of WSN in meeting wide area coverage and real-time 
demands of pipeline surveillance. Implementing distributed architecture and data fusion in WSN 
design as well as choosing high resource motes and good topology effectively enhances pipeline 
surveillance systems.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses threats to pipelines and 
forms of attacks. Section 3 presents related work and WSN applications, while Section 4 
elaborates on their requirements. Section 5 proposes a framework for pipeline monitoring and the 
research methodology is given in section 6. Finally, several propositions are presented in section 
7, while section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Most literature identify as causes of pipeline failure, corrosion, operational failures, material 
and construction defects, external interference and natural disasters. External interference 
dominates others  and encapsulates third party interference, such as construction work, or 
malicious attacks like theft, vandalism and sabotage [7]. This paper discusses causes of pipeline 
failure under human and natural threats since there is an observable trend showing that leak 
detection systems are more suitable for natural threats while external interference monitoring 
systems are more suitable for human threats. 
2.1. PIPELINE THREATS AND DETECTION 
Human threats could come in the form of vandalism, sabotage, operational error, and 
construction works.  Some attacks on pipelines are caused by groups of people who are in 
dispute with Government, or pipeline operators. This could be militant groups that attack 
pipelines as in the case of Niger Delta, in Nigeria [8]. Also, due to sheer greed or poverty, people 
resort to tampering with pipelines for personal gains. Instances include the case of theft from a 
pipeline passing underneath Deputy Prime Minister’s house in London [9], and persistent cases 
of pipeline sabotage in Nigeria [8].  Moreover, there have been growing concerns that terrorists 
might begin to use oil and gas pipelines as weapons of mass destruction [10].  Operational errors 
contribute considerably to pipeline failure either due to system failure, or technicians and 
pipeline operators at work [11]. Also, systems put in place to monitor corrosion as well as 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems could fail leading to pipeline 
failure. Concluding the discussion of human threats, construction work is a major cause of 
pipeline failure in the developed countries. In USA, pipeline incidents through construction work 
are mitigated using pipeline right-of-way surveillance, satellite surveillance, public awareness 
activities and one call system.  Other methods are acoustic monitoring and fiber-optic sensors 
buried along the pipeline.  
Deterrence of terrorists, vandals and thieves can be achieved by detecting common weapons 
used by these groups including explosives, guns, knives and other sharp objects. Vandals use 
axes, explosives and other sharp objects while thieves are likely to use drills, and containers or 
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tanks to siphon fuels. Technologies used to detect metallic and non-metallic weapons and 
explosives include Terahertz imaging, Neutron scattering, X-Ray scattering and Millimeter 
Wave (MMW) imaging. Terahertz detection has about 10 times better spatial resolution 
compared to MMW systems since THz radiation electromagnetic wavelength is about 10 times 
shorter than MMW radiation [12]. Terahertz imaging can detect objects from a distance of 0.5km 
which is deemed sufficient for proactively initiating defensive actions.  
 Natural threats to pipelines are mainly corrosion and natural disasters such as earthquakes 
and landslides. Pipeline corrosion is an electro-chemical process that changes metal back to ore 
as a result of a difference in potential between two points having a path for the flow of current 
which results in one of the points losing metal [13]. Different types of corrosion have been 
identified such as uniform attack, pitting, inter-granular or exfoliation, crevice, filiform, galvanic 
corrosion and stress corrosion. Coating prevents corrosion in pipelines, and in most cases 
cathodic protection is also used to further protect pipelines. Intelligent or smart pigs are used to 
gather pipeline data and detect leakages and metal loss. Corrosion detection technologies 
available include Visuals, Eddy Current, Ultrasonic, Radiography, Thermography, Robotics and 
Automation, Data Fusion and Sensor Fusion. In pipeline systems, pigging and eddy current are 
widely used to detect corrosion. Natural disasters such as earthquakes and landslides, due to their 
unpredictability, also constitute threats to pipelines. Scientists have reported the potentials of 
using seismic data to predict earthquakes and landslides but accurate predictions are still not 
possible. 
2.2 FORMS OF ATTACKS 
Often, pipeline operators make new connections to pipelines to expand or modify their 
existing system. This usually involves a shutdown (3 days or more) of the pipeline system and 
purging the oil or gas to ensure a safe atmosphere.  Hot tapping is an alternative process used to 
establish pipeline connections while the pipeline remains in service. It involves attaching a 
branch connection and valve on the outside of an operating pipeline, then cutting out the pipeline 
wall within the branch and removing the wall section through the valve [14]. It is used for 
corrosion repairs, upgrade work or other modification works on pipelines with no downtime. 
Alas, this industrial technical process is now being used by thieves to siphon fuel from pipelines. 
Explosive attack is carried out using explosives such as dynamites, C-4, HMX, RDX, and 
TNT. These attacks are carried out by militants, vandals, saboteurs’ terrorists or thieves. Most 
attacks on pipelines using explosives are done when the pipeline is not in operation. Explosive 
attacks carried out while pipelines are in operation result in fire and could claim the attackers’ 
lives.  
Tampering attacks, as used in this article, refer to attacks by third parties which neither 
involves hot taps nor explosives, still they are aimed at stealing fuels from the pipeline.  This 
often involves drilled holes on the pipeline, cutting the pipeline with hacksaw, or third party 
tampering with well head, clamps, valve settings and flanges [15]. 
3. RELATED WORKS AND WSN APPLICATIONS 
Pipeline surveillance is an important research field owing to the economic importance of 
pipelines as well as the health and safety implications of pipeline incidents. WSN has been 
identified as a cost-effective solution for pipeline surveillance. Besides pipeline surveillance, 
other applications of WSN in the oil and gas sector include leakage detection, Tank Level 
Monitoring, Equipment Condition Based Monitoring (CBM), Pipeline Pressure Relief Value 
Monitoring (PRV), Refineries Pressure Relief Value Monitoring (PRV) and Wellhead 
Automation and Monitoring. Although most pipeline surveillance systems have focused on leak 
detection [1];[16], few pipeline surveillance systems have tried to address threat detection in 
pipelines. Sun and Wen [17] investigated pipeline threat detection and security by developing a 
pre-warning system for pipeline security using multi-seismic sensors. Liang et. al [18] studied 
risk assessment of pipelines based on malicious and accidental threats. The authors used fault 
tree to determine the risk assessment index and thereafter used Self Organizing Maps (SOM) to 
classify sections of pipelines into various risk levels. Jawhar et al. [19] presented an ideal WSN 
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architectural model for pipelines while Seema and Reisslein [20] developed Node architectures 
for Wireless Video Sensor Networks Platforms (WVSNP). The authors discussed 
hardware/software requirements for WVSNP. Various models of WSN have been developed, 
with the dynamic linear configuration model being the most suitable for pipelines due to its 
linear nature Mohamed and Jawhar [21] and Jawhar et. al [19]. 
Wireless sensor networks have wide range of applications in the present-day technology. 
WSN used for intelligent transportation will differ from that used for telemedicine in various 
ways. Effective WSN for pipeline surveillance should detect leakages and threats to pipelines 
and localize such events with certain degree of accuracy. Three key design features to consider 
while designing effective WSN for pipeline surveillance, include adequate wireless mote, 
deployment topology and data mining technique. Oil and gas pipelines by nature traverse large 
geographical areas.  As such, wireless motes used for pipeline surveillance should employ power 
optimization strategies to conserve energy while being able to transmit over a considerable 
distance. In WSN design, factors considered depend on the specific task at hand even though a 
lot of factors are generic for various tasks.  
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR WSN 
In general, some factors to consider while designing a sensor node are as discussed below:  
Power Considerations - Power source is a crucial factor to consider while designing Wireless 
Multimedia Sensor Network (WMSN) motes. As these devices are wireless, they either need 
some stored energy in form of battery or generate their own power. They could generate energy 
through solar cells. However, due to size requirements, integrating solar cell is presently a 
challenge. Inter-sensor communications require a lot of energy. WMSN motes should use less 
power to enable their batteries last at least a year. As a rule of thumb, Seema and Reisslein [20] 
recommended that wireless motes should utilize less than 500 mW instantaneous power and less 
than 100 mW power during idle times. To sustain energy for the WMSN, it is recommended that 
energy harvesting (a process by which energy is derived from the environment) should be 
adopted. Although there are many energy harvesting technologies such as thermal, magnetic, 
radio frequency, vibration based, and under-water, solar energy harvesting has proved more 
efficient and more widely used. Also, energy optimization approaches should be adopted in 
WMSN designs. Three energy optimization techniques in WSN discussed by Boudhir et al. [22] 
including sensing,  processing and communication energies.   
Sensing Energy – Most WSNs sense physical quantities such as temperature, humidity, 
pressure, radiation etc. These sensing activities utilize power, so regulating the frequency of 
activities by these WSNs conserves energy. 
Processing Energy – In a computer system, the three units that utilize most of the energy are 
the processor, display and hard disk units. The processor and radio transceiver use most of the 
energy in WSNs. Dynamic Voltage Scaling, an emerging technology for reducing power 
utilization in hand held devices is good for WMSN energy optimization. 
Communication Energy – Media Access Control (MAC) is a technique used in both 
computer and sensor networks to control and manage data transmission. One of the fundamental 
tasks of MAC is to control data transmission in Networks so that two competing nodes do not 
transmit at the same time. Different MAC protocols have been used for optimizing energy 
utilization in wireless environments[23]. Sensor – MAC (S-MAC) is a MAC protocol designed 
to reduce energy utilization in WSN [24]. It reduces energy utilization by dividing the node time 
into periodic sleep and listening time. Timeout-MAC (T-MAC) has also been proposed [25]. 
This improves on S-MAC by reducing the listening time and transmitting the data in bursts of 
packets within the small listening time. Also, IEEE 802.15.4 is the standard MAC protocol for 
low power, low data rate wireless networks. It is the standard in most motes at present. It 
achieves low power utilization via low power transmission, small frame size and energy-efficient 
Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) algorithms. 
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Another energy optimization technique in WSN is the wireless charging system presently 
being developed. Qi standard was developed by Wireless Power Consortium (WPC) and is a 
good solution for WSN energy issues [26].   
Partitioning System Approach - There is a need to find the right balance in the trade-off 
between processing data at the sensor node and processing at the base station. When data is 
processed at the base station, it saves the sensor node a lot of power since the base station has 
more computational capability and no power constraint. On the other hand, transmitting 
unprocessed data require more energy than processed data which is less in size.   
Routing Protocols –Various routing protocols used in WSN have been designed to optimize 
energy during data transmission. Some hierarchical protocols such as Low-Energy Adaptive 
Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH), Threshold-Sensitive Energy Efficient Sensor Network protocol 
(TEEN) and Adaptive Periodic Threshold-sensitive Energy Efficient sensor Network (APTEEN) 
minimize energy utilization during data processing and transmission [22] and [27]. Figures 2 and 
3 are comparisons of energy utilization and longevity for these protocols respectively [27]. 
Communication Standards and Bandwidth Issues - In wireless communication, bandwidth is 
a critical factor for consideration. Presently, Wi-Fi, ZigBee, Bluetooth and Ultra-Wideband 
(UWB) are the four protocols used for wireless communication. Lee et al. [28] carried out a  
comparative study of the four wireless technology standards. Table 1 shows an extract. While 
ZigBee is the best for WSN due to its low power utilisation, Wi-Fi is the best for mobile devices 
and other computer networks due to better signal rate and improved bandwidth transmission. 
Although Bluetooth, UWB and Wi-Fi have signal rate of 1Mb, 110Mb and 54Mb respectively, 
ZigBee has only 250Kb/s, a big limitation to the use of ZigBee for Multimedia transmission. Yet, 
researchers are optimistic that low cost nature of ZigBee as a motivating factor could spur 
researchers to develop this technology for effective video transmission. A comparison of the 
power utilisation of these wireless technology standards is discussed in details in [28]. 
  
Processing Speed and Memory / Storage Capacity - Processing speed is a major factor in 
rating the performance of a WMSN mote. Ordinary WSN motes deal with data like temperature, 
light, pressure, humidity etc. while WMSN involves voice, images and videos that are usually 
bulky and take more storage space. WSNs need moderate-speed CPUs but bulky data associated 
with WMSN require more processing power for capturing, processing and transmission. As more 
processing speed is required for WMSN motes, more storage space is also needed for storage.  
Cost - Wireless sensors are low cost in nature due to the availability of cheap Complementary 
metal oxide semiconductors (CMOS). WSN solutions must maintain low cost to remain 
competitive among other solutions. According to Seema and Reisslein [20], the cost of an ideal 
WSN mote should be much less than $50.00 or £33.00 as at 2011. Table 2 shows the 
Comparison of Size, Weight and Cost of latest Motes in 2012 [29].       
 
Table 1: Comparison of Wireless Technology Standards 
  Wireless Standard 
   
  Attributes Bluetooth UWB Wi-Fi ZigBee 
IEEE Spec 802.15.1 802.15.3 802.11a/b/g 802.15.4 
Max Signal Rate 1Mb/s 110Mb/s 54Mb/s 250Kb/s 
TX Range 10m 10m 100m 10 -100m 
Nominal TX Power 0-10 dBm -41.3 dBm 15-20 dBm 
-25 - 0 
dBm 
Max No. Of Nodes 8 8 2007 > 65000 
 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Size, Weight and Cost of Latest Motes in 2012 
S/No Name of Motes Size in (mm) 
Weight 
(g) 
Cost per 
node 
1 MicaZ [8] 58*32*7 18 US$99 
2 TelosB [9] 65*31*6 23 US$99 
3 IRIS [10] 24.23*24.23*7.5 3 US$115 
4 SHIMMER [11] 44.5*20*13 10 US$262 
5 TinyNode [12] 30*40 -- US$180 
6 Sun SPOT [13] 41*23*70 54 US$750 
7 Cricket [14] ~58*32*7     ~18 US$225 
8 LOTUS [15] 76*34*7 18 US$300 
 
 
4.1 Considerations factors for WSN motes for Pipeline Surveillance 
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The main purpose of any network is to integrate and share information. Sensors are specific to 
the physical quantities they detect and no single sensor can detect all physical quantities. It is 
therefore important that WSN motes are able to integrate data from various sensors for the 
purpose of data mining. Effective motes should be able to integrate various sensors capable of 
detecting various physical quantities for the purpose of data mining to confirm leakages or 
threats to pipelines. Thus, key selection parameters for WMSN mote for pipelines surveillance 
are sensing modality, power optimization, localization capability, transmission range and 
security technology employed. Having extensively discussed power optimization strategies in 
section 4.1, we dedicate the rest of this section to discussing the remaining selection parameters 
for WMSN motes. 
4.1.1 Sensing Modality 
Sensors are devices that receive physical quantities and convert them to electrical energy.  
The physical quantities received vary in different sensors. The sensing modalities chosen or 
considered for WSN or mote design depend on the physical information required. There are 
various sensors in existence [30] but the ones that have been commonly used for pipeline leak 
monitoring include; acoustic, chemical, magnetic, optical, piezoelectric, thermal and ultrasonic 
sensors. Multi-modal sensing is an interesting but challenging research area since no single 
sensor can detect all physical quantities as mentioned earlier. Multi-modal sensing ability of 
motes will ensure that false alarms are avoided. In this regard, WSN motes with multimedia 
capability are more adequate for pipeline surveillance. Micro-Electromechanical Systems 
(MEMS) is one of the most promising technologies of the 21st century that enables various 
sensors to be combined into a single Integrated Circuit (IC) chip [31]. Traditional pipeline 
monitoring using sensors according to Owojaiye and Sun [32] are done either with steady-state 
detection methods or transient detection method. Steady-state detection work with the concept 
that most pipeline parameters such as pressure, flow, temperature, and vibration remain constant 
unless there is an anomaly such as leakage or third-party damage. This method uses pre-defined 
thresholds to detect pipeline incidents and attacks. Unlike the former, transient detection methods 
are used where the pipeline parameters change rapidly over time. The Real-Time Transient 
Model (RTTM) also known as dynamic model based system, mathematically models the one-
dimensional hydraulic behaviours of pipelines. They work with the principle of conservation of 
mass, momentum, energy as well as the equation of state for the fluid Bai Yong [33]. The 
conservation laws are described by non-steady partial differential equations in which hydraulic 
parameters such as pressure, temperature and flow of liquid are functions of time and distance 
along the pipeline. This method requires that pipeline parameters readings be taken at both the 
inlet and outlets of pipelines. Preferably, taking measurements of pipeline parameters at 
designated points along the pipeline will increase efficiency of the system. 
As early as 1987, Billmann and Isermann [34] demonstrated the use of this method to detect 
leakage in pipeline. Since then, researchers including Colombo et al [16]; Giustolisi et al [35]; 
Vitkovsky et al [36] and Egyptian et al [37] have done remarkable work on transient method of 
pipeline leak detection which is known for its high sensitivity. 
4.1.2 Event localization 
Event localization capability is an important design consideration for motes. As discussed in 
section 5 below, motes are able to localize pipeline incidents using GPS sensors. Various 
localization techniques are used but it has been shown that using GPS in every mote may not be 
cost effective. Some motes could therefore determine their positions relative to GPS enabled 
motes [19]. 
4.1.3 Transmission Range 
Adopting a good deployment topology for pipeline WSN ensures that the network can cover 
the geographical area spanned by the pipeline system while conserving transmission energy.  
Common topologies used for WSN design are tree/cluster, mesh, ring and star topologies.  
However, pipelines are linear in nature and none of these topologies would give optimum 
performance for pipeline surveillance. Accordingly, Jawhar et al. [19] proposed a linear topology 
for pipelines considering power, transmission range, security and other factors. Also, the design 
should establish if direct access or multi-hop is used. While direct access requires only one 
transmission for the receiving node to be accessed, multi-hop requires that the packets are 
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forwarded by one or more node before the receiving node. Generally, good deployment topology 
results in high performance of the WSN. 
4.1.4 Security Technology 
The importance of security in WSN cannot be over-emphasised. A breach in the security of 
WSN could result in the breakdown of the entire WSN. Notable security technologies that are 
employed to secure WSN were summarised by Yang et al. [38] as encryption / key management, 
certification and routing protocol security. Encryption is indispensable in WSN since network 
data travel from one place to another and could be intercepted by an adversary. In WSN 
cryptography, numerous key management mechanisms are employed to encrypt data. The 
performances of five popular encryption schemes used in WSN were evaluated in Ganesan et al. 
[39] as seen in Perrig [40] and it was concluded that MD5 and SHA-1 incur more overhead than 
RD4, RD5 and IDEA algorithms. Moreover, Zhang et al. [41] presented a classification and 
comparison of key management protocols used in WSNs as seen in [40]. No key management 
protocol can be selected as the best over others, however protocols employing pairwise key 
management showed best results in power consumption and communication overhead as well as 
high security [42].  
Certification in network security could be identity authentication or message authentication.  
It is a way of confirming the integrity of the party or message received. Certification could be 
implemented using symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithm. From the energy 
conservation perspective, symmetric cryptosystem is preferred to asymmetric method in WSN 
because less power is required. However, considering network security, asymmetric 
cryptography perform better [38]. 
In routing protocol security, categories employed include Data-centric secure routing 
protocols, Location-based secure routing protocols, Hierarchical-based security routing protocol 
and Multipath transmission-based routing protocols. As discussed in section 4, hierarchical 
routing protocols such as LEACH, TEEN and APTEEN perform very well in terms of energy 
conservation. Multipath routing protocols on the other hand are known for higher security 
resistance than others. 
4.2 Data Fusion 
Data fusion is a design strategy used to achieve two important design goals; (i) to optimize 
energy in wireless motes (ii) to implement data mining and extract useful information from data 
for decision making. Although implementation of data fusion for the purpose of energy 
optimization is expected to occur at various senor nodes (especially Aggregation and Forwarding 
Nodes (AFN) [43]), majority of data fusion implementation for data mining should occur at sub-
stations or the base station.  For the former’s design goal, routing algorithms are designed such 
that data fusion reduces the amount of network communication, and thus the amount of power 
consumed for data transmission. The latter’s design goal however, aims at acquiring 
complimentary information from various sensors to increase the accuracy of the overall decision 
making process. This is because no single sensor can capture all information about the 
surroundings and sensor information are most times uncertain, inaccurate and sometimes 
conflicting [44]. 
Popular technologies that have been used to realize data fusion include Ambient Intelligence 
(AmI), Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), Multi-Agent System (MAS) and Enterprise 
Application Integration (EAI). These are distributed architectures aimed at integrating 
subsystems to improve performance. Tapia et.al [45] developed FUSION@ based on SOA in 
order to integrate multi-agent systems and build AmI based system. FUSION@ provides better 
integration with services and applications which is lacking in previous frameworks for MAS. It 
also offers computational capability and intelligent computation which are lacking in most SOA 
frameworks. Although FUSION@ provides integration with services and applications, it was not 
developed for heterogeneous system. Services laYers over Light PHysical devices (SYLPH) [46] 
on the other hand is developed to integrate heterogeneous WSN based on various radio 
technologies. Hardware-Embedded Reactive Agents (HERA) [47] just like SYLPH employs 
heterogeneous devices with reduced resources to save CPU time, memory size and power 
consumption. HERA however, has an edge over SYLPH since it adds reactive agents and 
reasoning mechanism to make it context aware. HERA embeds agents directly into WSN nodes 
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and their services can be invoked from other nodes. It also uses Case-Based Planning model [48] 
that solves problems using previous solutions to similar problems. 
Although these platforms discussed employ distributed systems to implement data fusion for 
better decision making, they are not developed for multimedia applications and are therefore not 
suitable for WMSN applications.  
  
5. REQUIREMENTS FOR PIPELINE SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING  
Efficient and effective pipeline monitoring is the dream of any pipeline operator as this 
prevents wastage through leakages and forestalls pending pipeline incidents. However, such 
monitoring system is hard to come by as a lot of resources are needed to actualize it. To protect 
the environment and the people while forestalling economic loss, the pipeline operators put 
series of protections in place. Among these according to PHMSA [49] are “customized leak 
detection technology deployment; periodic risk-based assessment and defect repair prioritized by 
environmental and safety consequences; corrosion management; pipeline right-of-way 
surveillance; public awareness activities; emergency preparedness and coordinated response, 
liaison efforts with emergency responders; and a review and incorporation of lessons learned 
from accident analysis and investigations”. Thus, for good pipeline monitoring system, the 
resources and factors discussed below should be considered. 
Information Communication System/Flow Computers - A Robust Information 
Communication System is a sine qua non of pipeline inspection. Computer systems are needed, 
to receive, analyse, store and retrieve pipeline information regarding leakages. To detect 
leakages, these computers process flow pressure, volume and temperature difference between 
two reference points then generate alerts if the value is more than certain threshold. 
Location Detection/GPS – Event localisation is very important in pipeline surveillance. 
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) are used to identify positions of incidents when patrol teams 
collate pipeline data for analysis. They offer instant communication for incidents in pipeline 
system. GPSs are often integrated into sensor nodes to enable them give accurate positions of 
pipeline incidents. 
GIS for Pipeline Route Information - Geographic Information System (GIS) database or data 
are needed for pipeline route information preferably in a map or table dividing the pipeline 
routes into sections. With pipeline routes categorised into sections, it is possible to assign 
different levels of risks or threats to different pipeline sections.  GIS-based map enables us to tell 
if data or population distribution in a certain geographical region is clustered, dispersed, or 
randomly distributed. Also, it enables response team to trace reported pipeline incidents easily. It 
is a resourceful tool used by National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) of USA for pipeline 
management [50]. 
Round – the – Clock Availability - Thieves and vandals would attack pipelines when no one 
will notice and this could be day or night. As such, Pipeline monitoring systems should be 
operational both day and night. To achieve such availability, power efficiency and reliability are 
crucial factors to be considered as earlier discussed. 
Low Cost System - Most pipeline systems cover a wide area and require great efforts and 
resources to monitor.  For instance, USA has about 2.6 million miles pipeline transportation 
system which is capable of going round the earth more than 100 times [51] while Nigeria has 
about 5,120 Kilometres of pipeline. Therefore, effective monitoring of such area of infrastructure 
would require low cost devices to cover the infrastructure at reasonable cost. 
Compatibility with other systems - A lot of solutions for pipeline monitoring systems are in 
existence today.  The ability of a system therefore to work with other products for pipeline 
monitoring purpose is considered as an advantage. This not only compliments the other system 
but also provides needed redundancy. Modular design of motes as in the case of CITRIC mote 
where image processing unit is separated from the networking unit promotes  compatibility [20].  
In the same vein, designers could design motes that work with standard Wi-Fi cameras such that 
video signals could be received wirelessly and processed before being transmitted to base station.  
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Others (Sensors) - Sensors are indispensable in pipeline monitoring. Some sensors used for 
this task include motion, seismic, acoustic, fibre optic and camera sensors.  Cameras are very 
useful in monitoring threats and could be used to detect leakages as well.  Motion sensors could 
be used to design smart motes which are only triggered by specific events. Individuals and 
moving vehicles approaching pipelines as well as pipe leakages generate seismic waves that 
could be detected with seismic sensors. Fibre optics is widely used in communication industries 
and offers numerous advantages including immunity to electromagnetic interference, high 
temperature performance, large bandwidth, high sensitivity, environmental ruggedness and 
distributed sensing. 
6. METHODOLOGY 
In this work, literature search was conducted on related researches with the keywords pipeline 
surveillance, pipeline monitoring, wireless sensor networks, wireless sensor network motes, 
critical infrastructure protection and wireless multimedia sensor networks and relevant articles 
reviewed accordingly. Following the literature review, a survey was conducted in the pipeline 
industry to ascertain the level of third-party interference (TPI) on pipelines. The survey revealed 
that TPI or external interference constituted majority of the pipeline failures. In a bid to model a 
system to manage and mitigate TPI and external interference on TPI, Universal Modelling 
Language (UML) was used to develop Use Case Scenarios for each type of pipeline attack using 
the Case-based Planning model concept. Thereafter, a framework and architecture for WMSN 
for pipeline monitoring termed IOPMIMS was developed. Finally, data collected from 
CONCAWE website were simulated to investigate the performance of the proposed system. 
Three machine learning algorithms including Neural Network (NN), Support vector Machine 
(SVM) and Decision Tree (DT) were investigated. Results obtained shows that SVM gave the 
best performance with 91.2% accuracy while NN and DT gave 63% and 57% accuracy 
respectively. 
7. PROPOSITIONS 
Extensive study of pipeline attacks has been carried out and various use case scenarios were 
developed for each type of pipeline attack using the Case-based Planning model concept. Due to 
limited space required for this publication, only one example of many use cases developed, 
“general use case scenario” is given.   
7.1 General Use Case Scenario for Pipeline Monitoring System 
7.1.1 Description:  The general use case scenario shown in Figure 1 describes how an attacker 
(Vandal or Thief) is detected before damage to the pipeline takes place. This is irrespective of 
the means of transportation, or mode of attack on the pipeline. 
7.1.2 Actors: The actors include; (1) Attacker (2) System Administrator (3) Security officer 
7.1.3 Basic Event Flow: 
1. The attacker approaches the pipeline  
2. The sensors (seismic and motion sensors) detect the presence of the attacker 
3. Signal is generated and video camera is initialised 
4. Video recording starts as well as transmission to the internet and base station 
5. Video analysis is done by the Decision Support System (DSS) 
6. Other sensor data such as pressure and volume (rate of flow) are collated and fused  
7. Threat and location of threat to the pipeline is confirmed and threat level assigned 
8. Alert is generated and sent to the security officers or various stakeholders. 
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Figure 1:  General Use Case Scenario for Pipeline Monitoring Using WSN 
 
7.2 Proposed WMSN Node Architecture 
An ideal WMSN Node comprises Power Supply Unit (PSU), Processing, memory, transceiver 
and sensing units [4] and [29]. PSUs are usually batteries, designed to sustain motes for long 
period of at least a year. A mote’s processing unit, the microcontroller unit (MCU) is responsible 
for controlling sensors, gathering and processing sensed data, executing WSN applications, and 
managing communication protocols and algorithms. The MCU consists of the processor, 
memory, non-volatile memory and interfaces such as SPI, UART, GPIO, counters and timers[4]. 
Merits of MCU over microprocessors are faster speed, more reliability and lower cost. MCUs 
attributes include number of bits, memory size, flash memory, operating voltage, current, power 
mode, number of ADC and timers.  It is recommended that at least 32 bit MCU should be used in 
order to meet the high computation requirement of WMSN. Based on the requirements discussed 
in sections 4 and 5, we have designed a conceptual architecture of an ideal WMSN mote for 
pipeline monitoring as seen in figure 2 below.  
The communication or transceiver unit of a mote is used for the transmission and reception of 
signal in a WSN. IEEE802.15.4 is the technology of choice for WSN and uses ZigBee 
technology. Wi-Fi would have been a great option for WMSN considering the huge bandwidth 
required.  However, the power usage of Wi-Fi is a serious limitation to this. Most common chips 
employed in WSN today such as CC1000, CC2420, CC2500, and CC2480 from Texas 
Instruments use the IEEE802.15.4 ZigBee standard. We advocate dual Wi-Fi-ZigBee radio 
integration as recommended by Seema and Reisslein [20] for effective multimedia transmission. 
Some advantages of ZigBee over other wireless technologies include low power usage, and low 
cost. Major limitations of ZigBee include low data rate and lack of interoperability with existing 
devices unlike Bluetooth technology. Though Mohamed and Jawhar [21] provided redundancy 
using a combination of wired and wireless connections, our work provides redundancy using 
dual ZigBee/Wi-Fi transceiver radio. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual architecture of an Ideal WMSN Mote for Pipeline Monitoring. 
7.3 PROPOSED INTEGRATED OIL AND GAS PIPELINE MONITORING AND 
INCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM (IOPMIMS) 
The basic concept of IOPMIMS is to use MAS to integrate heterogeneous sensors for pipeline 
surveillance. Prospective sensor nodes for IOPMIMS would use the architecture depicted in 
figure 2 to effectively process and transmit high resource intensive data such as multimedia data. 
The WMSN architecture presented has the capability to acquire signals from various sensors 
such as seismic, motion and cameras sensors. The dual radio composition improves efficiency in 
multimedia transmission via Wi-Fi and power usage via ZigBee. Thereafter, an MAS embedded 
in AFN nodes performs data fusion on these signals at designated sub-station and the base station 
to confirm if certain events constitute a threat to the pipeline. With the concept of distributed 
system, the AFNs at sub-stations aggregate the data and fuse them before uploading them online 
or forwarding to base station. The general architecture for IOPMIMS is shown in figure 3 below.  
In addition to the preliminary aggregation of data at the substation, the MAS at the base 
station collates information from other devises such as GPS, wireless camera equipped drones, 
pipeline flow meters and pressure sensors for threat and leakage detection.  Upon detection of 
threat or leakage in the pipeline system, decision is taken by the system and actionable 
information or alerts are sent to security personnel or pipeline operators. 
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Figure 3: Conceptual architecture for IOPMIMS 
 
Shortcomings of existing motes and suggestions to address them 
The data analysis above highlights the need for effective pipeline monitoring against 
intrusion. WSN motes though widely used for monitoring have some shortcomings limiting their 
usage for pipeline monitoring as discussed below: 
Most existing WSN motes have batteries that cannot last for more than one year. It is 
recommended that WMSN motes use solar power, wireless rechargeable batteries or both to 
sustain the motes for longer duration. Low bandwidth problems experienced in multimedia 
communication could be addressed with the integration of ZigBee and Wi-Fi transmitters in 
WMSN motes. These two technologies were tested and confirmed to have negligible interference 
with each other[52]. With this design, small data for physical quantities are transmitted via 
ZigBee while large volumes of multimedia data are transmitted via Wi-Fi. 
Video recording and analysis is essential for pipeline monitoring to confirm remote incidents 
thereby avoiding false alarms. Thus, integration of Cameras be it standalone or built-in are 
crucial for WMSN. Though WSN motes are generally low cost in nature, a lot of these are 
needed to cover lengthy pipelines traversing a geographical region. Thus, WMSN motes must be 
very cheap in order to cover lengthy pipelines. 
8. CONCLUSION  
Security experts have advocated for layered security for CIP and an integrated approach as 
provided by WSN is a great means of providing layered security. The requirements for effective 
pipeline surveillance have been critically reviewed in this paper. Based on the review focusing 
on the need for proactive protection of pipeline, IOPMIMS has been proposed. This proposition 
is unique because IOPMIMS is a concept that uses distributed systems, MAS and Case-based 
reasoning to provide proactive protection to pipelines.  Distributed system concept enables AFNs 
at sub-stations to interact with one another as well as the base station to share information.  The 
MAS feature on the other hand enables the system to collate data from heterogeneous wireless 
devices for more informed decision.  Moreover, through case-based reasoning, the system can 
use previous trained data to detect pipeline threat and leakages.  
This paper demonstrated how effective WSN for pipeline surveillance could be realized by 
selecting appropriate wireless sensor node, adequate deployment topology and adequate data 
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mining technique. Such system should implement MAS and SOA to integrate heterogeneous 
sensors so that data from cameras, pressure sensors, flow meters and other sensors could be used 
to detect pipeline threats and leakages. We have identified some shortcomings of existing WSN 
motes in terms of pipeline monitoring and given some measures to address them. The 
requirements and components of motes that make them adequate for pipeline surveillance have 
been discussed. Due to the nature of this task, an ideal mote for pipeline surveillance should be a 
WMSN mote that could deal with resource intensive data associated with multimedia data 
processing. Thus, this should be a mote with at least 32 bit MCU since these utilize less power 
than 16-bit and 8-bit MCUs in the order of about half of 8-bit MCU power. Also to overcome 
issues associated with transmission of resource intensive multimedia data, researchers should put 
more efforts in designing an MCU with dual ZigBee and Wi-Fi transmitters. With this, 
multimedia data could easily be sent to the internet through Wi-Fi while taking advantage of 
ZigBee’s low power utilization for other communication. Thus, motes designed with the WMSN 
architecture presented will have improved power efficiency as well as improved multimedia data 
transmission. Integration of heterogeneous multi-agent sensors, application of case-based 
reasoning and implementation of data fusion on the output of various sensors will ensure that 
there is no false alarm experienced. 
Simulation of the proposed WMSN architecture for Pipeline Monitoring motes to find the best 
machine learning algorithm for data fusion and decision support system indicates that SVM 
gives the best performance with an accuracy of 91.2% over NN and DT. 
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